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How does your state select its judges?
The relative popularity of these selection methods has changed a 
great deal over the course of American history.  The U.S. Consti-
tution follows the democratic appointment model: federal judges 
are nominated by the president and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. 
Similarly, at the time of the founding of the United States, judges in 
all the states were selected by the democratic appointment model: 
they were either appointed by the governor and legislature or by 
the legislature alone.  This began to change in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when, in the wake of Andrew Jackson’s presi-
dency, states began replacing democratic appointment with judi-
cial elections.  By the time of the Civil War, the vast majority of 
states were selecting their judges much like other public ocials 
in partisan elections.  In the late nineteenth century, states began to 
replace their partisan judicial elections with nonpartisan elections.
During the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century, a 
new method was conceived whereby a nominating commission 
would play a powerful role in selecting judges; the commission 
would narrow down a pool of judicial appli-
cants to a short list of finalists from which the 
governor would be required to choose.  The 
commission was designed to include members 
selected by the bar, rather than by the people 
or popularly-elected ocials.  In 1940, Mis-
souri was the first state to adopt a commission 
with a special role for the bar and the com-
mission method has since been known as the 
Missouri Plan.  Several states have adopted versions of the Missouri 
Plan with varying levels of power for the bar.  Other states use hy-
brids of the Missouri Plan and democratic appointment in which a 
commission with a special role for the bar is combined with con-
firmation of judicial nominees by the senate or other popularly-
elected body.
As things stand today, the most common method to select 
judges to the courts of last resort (e.g., state supreme courts) is 
still elections, although some election states use appointment to fill 
interim judicial vacancies.  The second most common method is 
the Missouri Plan.  Smaller numbers of states use a democratic ap-
pointment process or hybrids of the Missouri Plan and democratic 
appointment methods.  The relative popularity of these selection 
methods is a bit dierent for lower appellate and trial courts, but 
the focus of this article is courts of last resort.  Each of the selection 
systems is discussed in more detail on the following pages. 
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T
he fifty United States use a great variety of methods to select 
their judges.  These methods can be broadly grouped into three 
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Missouri Plan.  Some states use hybrids of democratic appointment and 
the Missouri Plan.
Note: This article is an attempt to provide an objective summary analysis of the methods most commonly used to select state supreme court judges.  The 
arguments set forth herein do not necessarily reflect the authors’ views. 
LEGEND
ELECTIONS:  Judges are directly elected by 
the voters of the state.
Non-Partisan
DEMOCRATIC APPOINTMENT:  Judges are 
appointed directly by a democratic body, or 
appointed by the governor with the advice 
and consent of a democratic body.  
(Note: Democratic body = popularly-elected 
officials or judges nominated and confirmed 
by popularly-elected officials.
1) Legislative and 2) Gubernatorial
MISSOURI PLAN:  Judges are appointed 
by the governor after nomination by a 
commission without confirmation by a 
democratic body.
No bar-selected members on 
commission.
HYBRID:  Judges are appointed by the 
governor after nomination by a commission 




that are faithful to the law and the constitution can be removed 
more easily through elections than through some of the other 
methods of selection.
Instability
Because the results of partisan judicial elections can be influenced 
by party aliation, the ideological composition of the judiciary 
can change significantly from one election to the next.  To the 
extent judges render decisions consistently with their ideological 
dispositions, the content of the law can move sharply to the left 
or to the right after each election.  This concern is especially acute 
when judges face short terms before re-election.  When judges 
have longer terms of oce (a “longer leash”) the direction of the 
law changes more slowly.
Campaign atmospherics and fundraising
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speaking to voters, making statements about legal issues, and, es-
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the judiciary.  Many times, judges raise money from lawyers or 
parties that might appear before them.  If judges do not recuse 
themselves in these cases, it raises the specter that judges will make 
decisions based on campaign contributions.   On the other hand, 
although there is some empirical evidence that campaign fundrais-
ing undermines the public’s confidence in the courts, there is not 
much evidence that other campaign activities do.  Moreover, there 
are possible solutions to the threats posed by fundraising, such as 
asking judges to recuse themselves from cases involving campaign 
donors, making campaign donations anonymous, and publicly fi-
nancing judicial elections.
Voters do not know enough to select judges
While judging, especially at the supreme court level, does involve 
making law to fill out ambiguous legal texts, it also involves the 
technical, lawyerly tasks of applying law to facts and running a 
courtroom eciently.  In this regard, judges are more like the ad-
ministrators of specialized government agencies (who are appoint-
ed by popularly-elected ocials) than like the popularly-elected 
governors and legislators, who enact broad policies and rely on 
their appointees with the technical knowledge to implement them. 
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whether a candidate for a judgeship possesses these technical, law-
yerly skills.  As a result, they believe voters select judges on arbi-
trary grounds such as whether they like a candidate’s last name. 
Others are more optimistic about voters’ abilities.  In partisan elec-
tion states, voters can rely on party aliation to tell them about the 
likely beliefs of judicial candidates.  Moreover, although assess-
ing the qualifications of judges can be complex, some believe it is 
no more complex than assessing the qualifications of other public 
ocials, such as governors or legislators, who are asked to write 
the very same laws that judges are asked to interpret.  Empirical 
studies have not clearly shown that judges selected by elections are 
better or worse qualified than judges selected by other methods.   
ALEC POLICY FORUM
The plurality of states uses judicial elections to select their judges. 
Judicial elections are run much like elections for other public of-
ficials such as governors and state legislators: two or more candi-
dates can run for a position, the public votes, and the candidate 
with the most votes wins.  Many states currently use partisan elec-
tions for their judges where candidates are aliated with a politi-
cal party on the ballot, but many other states currently use non-
partisan elections where party aliation is not listed on the ballot.
ADVANTAGES
There are several commonly cited advantages of using elections to 
select judges:
Democratic accountability 
It is often asserted that elections foster democratic accountability. 
Legal texts are often ambiguous and judges exercise a great deal of 
discretion over the content and direction of the law by interpret-
ing those texts.  When judicial elections are used to select judges, 
judges are likely to exercise their discretion in accordance with the 
preferences of a majority of the public.  This is especially so when 
judges have short terms of oce before facing re-election so the 
electorate can keep judges on a short leash. 
Performance accountability
Judges that are corrupt, incompetent, or unfaithful to the law 
and the constitution can be removed more easily through elec-
tions than through some of the other methods of selection, such 
as uncontested retention referenda, which, as noted below, were 
designed to insulate judges from removal.
Independence from the other branches of government
One of the original motivations to elect judges was to give judges 
an independent base of political power so that they would not be 
beholden to the governor or the legislature.  This independence 
furthers the ability of the judiciary to check and balance the execu-
tive and the legislature.  On the other hand, to the extent judges 
need the support of the same political parties and interest groups 
influential in gubernatorial and legislative races, some people be-
lieve such independence is often overstated.
DISADVANTAGES
There are also several commonly cited disadvantages to electing 
judges and especially to requiring sitting judges to win re-election 
in order to retain their jobs:
Threat to the rule of law
When the law is not ambiguous, there is a danger that judges who 
run for election will feel pressure to disregard clear laws in order 
to avoid making decisions that are controversial with various seg-
ments of the public.  That is, sometimes we want judges who will 
not interpret the law in accordance with public preferences.  The 
threat to rule-of-law values is especially acute in judicial elections 
because judicial decisions can be easy to caricature in television 
attack ads (e.g., this judge “cares more about corporations than 
injured people.”) that often run in these elections.  In turn, judges 
Elections
Several states use a method of selecting judges for their courts of 
last resort similar to the U.S. Constitution’s method of selecting 
federal judges.  In these states, the governor nominates judges but 
the governor’s nominee does not join the court unless confirmed 
by the state senate or similar popularly-elected body.  Once con-
firmed, judges in most democratic appointment states serve a term 
of years, at which point they must be reappointed or retained in 
uncontested referenda through which voters can remove the judg-
es from the bench.
ADVANTAGES
There are several commonly cited advantages to selecting judges 
by democratic appointment:
Indirect democratic accountability 
It is often thought that appointment will lead to judges who will 
exercise their discretion over the content and direction of the law 
in accordance with the preferences of a majority of the public. 
This is the case because the public ocials who must appoint and 
confirm them where themselves elected by the majority of voters. 
This mechanism is less direct and less swift than it is in systems 
of judicial elections because public preferences take time to filter 
through governors and legislatures to reach and impact the judi-
ciary.  Some people like this delay because they believe it insulates 
judges somewhat from the prevailing political winds and increases 
stability in the law.
Public o!cials know enough to select judges
It is thought that public ocials are better able to assess the qual-
ifications of judges than are voters because they are themselves 
lawyers or can ask lawyers to vet judicial candidates.  Empirical 
studies have not clearly shown that judges selected by democratic 




No campaign atmospherics  
Because judges need not run for election or retention when they 
win their jobs through political appointment, they need not meet 
with voters, make campaign promises, or raise campaign money. 
Thus, there are not the same concerns as in other systems with 
the eect of campaign atmospherics have on judicial legitimacy. 
On the other hand, some people believe that judges in this system 
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public ocials by making promises behind closed doors.  To the 
extent people believe politicking of this sort exists and this sort of 
politicking threatens judicial legitimacy, it is unclear how much of 
an advantage political appointment oers on this point.
DISADVANTAGES
There are also several commonly cited disadvantages to selecting 
judges by democratic appointment:
Lack of independence from the other branches
As noted above, one of the main reasons states moved away from 
appointment and toward elections for judges is because many peo-
ple believe that judges who must win appointment and especially 
reappointment from the governor and legislature will not be in-
dependent from those entities.  This is why the U.S. Constitution 
gives federal judges life tenure.  Life tenure gives judges a sub-
stantial degree of independence from the branches that appointed 
them.  For this reason, states with democratic appointment tend to 
give their judges long terms of oce.
Cronyism
Some people believe that public ocials use judicial appointments 
to reward their friends and campaign donors.  On the other hand, 
requiring both the executive and the legislature to place a judge on 
the bench may mitigate this concern.
The Missouri Plan was conceived as one of several Progressive Era 
reforms to the judiciary.  Like other Progressive Era reforms, the 
Missouri Plan was designed to remove government decision-mak-
ing from the political process and place it instead in the hands of 
“experts.”  The “experts” identified by progressives to select judges 
were lawyers and, in particular, state bar associations.  Bar associa-
tions were the primary advocates of this system when it was first 
conceived and remain the primary advocates today.
The Missouri Plan consists of two main design features.  First, 
judges are appointed to the bench by the governor from a list of 
names submitted by a nominating commission.  In most Missouri 
Plan states, lawyers are required by law to be well represented on 
the nominating commission.  Moreover, in most Missouri Plan 
states, the bar fills most or all of the lawyer seats on the commis-
sions, either by directly selecting members for the commission or 
by controlling the list of names from which elected ocials must 
select members.
Second, at some point after appointment, judges come before 
the public in uncontested referenda through which voters can re-
move the judges from the bench.  That is, judges have no oppo-
nents in these races and voters are asked only to answer “yes” or 
“no” on whether judges should be retained.  Incumbent high-court 
judges are returned to the bench 99 percent of the time across the 
country when they run in retention referenda.  As such, it is much 
more dicult to remove incumbents in Missouri Plan states than 
in states that use judicial elections.
ADVANTAGES
There are several commonly cited advantages of using the Missouri 
Plan to select judges:
Commissions, especially their lawyer members, know 
enough to select judges
Like the democratic appointment method, it is thought that the 
lawyers who sit on Missouri Plan commissions are better able to as-
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ALEC POLICY FORUM
more about the law.  Some people assert that Missouri Plan judges 
may be even better qualified than judges selected by democratic 
appointment because there will be no political cronyism in the se-
lections.  On the other hand, some people believe that the lawyers 
on the nominating commission could exercise their own brand of 
cronyism by nominating their friends for the bench.  Empirical 
studies have not clearly shown that judges selected by Missouri 
Plan commissions are better or worse qualified than judges select-
ed by other methods.
Minimal campaign atmospherics
Because it is so dicult for judges to lose uncontested retention 
referenda, judges need not meet with voters, make campaign 
promises, or raise campaign money to the same extent they must 
in contested judicial elections.  On the other hand, they are per-
mitted to do these things in Missouri Plan states, and Missouri Plan 
judges have been criticized for taking campaign donations and giv-
ing campaign contributions to political candidates.
Independence from the political branches and the 
public
Some people believe that Missouri Plan judges can stand up to the 
political branches and the public as required by the rule-of-law 
values because they are not much dependent on either group to 
win or keep their jobs.  On the other hand, to the extent the bar 
has significant influence over Missouri Plan nominating commis-
sions, it may be that judges are not as independent from the bar as 
they are in other selection systems.
DISADVANTAGES
There are also several commonly cited disadvantages to using the 
Missouri Plan to select judges:
Lawyer domination
One of the motivations behind the Missouri Plan was to shift pow-
er over judicial selection away from the electorate and toward the 
bar.  Some people believe that members of the bar should have no 
more influence over the selection of important public ocials like 
judges than other members of the public.  Others have noted that 
lawyers are not representative of the public, and the judges they 
select will reflect the preferences of lawyers rather than the prefer-
ences of the public.  To the extent that, as many people believe, 
lawyers are more liberal than the public at large is, judges selected 
with the Missouri Plan judges may issue more liberal opinions 
than if they had been selected with another system.  Empirical 
studies have shown that Missouri Plan judicial nominees in some 
states are more liberal than the electorates in those states.
Lack of democratic and performance accountability
Some people believe that the Missouri Plan leaves judges less ac-
countable to democratic and other forces than either judicial elec-
tions or democratic appointment because judges are selected in 
large part by the bar rather than the public or elected ocials and 
because it is so dicult to remove judges through the uncontested 
referendum device.  On the other hand, as noted above, there are 
occasions when many people believe that judges should not inter-
pret the law in accordance with public preferences.
Cronyism
Some people believe that the lawyers on Missouri Plan commis-
sions will nominate their friends for judgeships rather than people 
they do not know who may be more qualified.  Although cronyism 
is arguably minimized in the democratic appointment model by 
requiring another branch of government to approve any nomina-
tion by the governor, there is not the same check on the Missouri 
Plan.  Although the governor must sign o any Missouri Plan ap-
pointment, the governor is required under the Missouri Plan to 
pick one of the names sent to him by the commission.  The gover-
nor cannot, therefore, keep rejecting nominations until the com-
mission has a sent a name lacking cronyism as, for example, a state 
senate could under the democratic appointment method.
Hybrid
As noted above, several other states use hybrids of the demo-
cratic appointment and Missouri Plan systems.  These systems in-
clude a nominating commission, but with less power for the bar 
than in Missouri Plan states, plus confirmation of judicial nomi-
nees by the senate or similar popularly-elected body.  The advan-
tages and disadvantages of the systems in these states are largely 
the same as those described in the states that use democratic ap-
pointment or the Missouri Plan on their own.
Conclusion
As the sweep of American history shows, there is not one obvious 
answer to the question of what is the best way to select judges. 
Each system has its own advantages and its own disadvantages. 
Which systems are better than others depend on the values and 
political philosophies that each of us brings to questions of public 
policy.
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